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SECURITIES-INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940-ANTIFRAUD PROVISIONS
INTERPRETED-Defendant, Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., an investment advisory service, published a bulletin entitled "A Capital Gains
Report," each issue of which advised approximately 5,000 subscribers as
to the investment potential of a particular corporation's stock. On at least
five occasions Capital Gains, and its president and sole stockholder, also a
defendant, acquired some shares of a stock and, without revealing their
interest therein, recommended its purchase in the bulletin. Following each
recommendation, trading in the stock increased, the price rose, and, within
a few days, defendants sold their shares at a profit.1 The Securities and
Exchange Commission, alleging that defendants, by failing to disclose
their individual interests in the stocks, had violated section 206, clauses
(I) and (2), of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,2 sought a temporary
restraining order, preliminary injunction, and final injunction against
defendants. Clauses (I) and (2) provide: "It shall be unlawful for any
investment adviser • • • (I) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud any client or prospective client; (2) to engage in any transaction,
practice, or course of business, which operates as a fraud or deceit upon
any client or prospective client." The district court denied the motion
for a preliminary injunction.3 A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit affirmed, one judge dissenting. 4 Upon rehearing
en bane, held, affirmed, four judges dissenting. Under clauses (I) and (2),
an investment adviser is under no affirmative duty to those advised to
disclose information regarding his personal holdings in a recommended
stock. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 306 F.2d 606 (2d Cir.
1962), cert. granted, 371 U.S. 967 (1963).
At common law, where one party to a business transaction is under
a duty of disclosure, he is liable to the other for harm caused by his intentional failure to disclose facts of which the other is ignorant and which.
1 On a sixth occasion, defendants took a short position in a stock and, without
disclosing this position, advised that the stock was overvalued. Immediately following
this advice, trading in the stock increased, the price fell, and defendants bought in at
a profit.
2 54 Stat. 852, 15 U.S.C. §§ SOb-6(1), (2) (1958). For general surveys of the act, see
2 Loss, SECUJUTIES R.EcULAnoN 1!192-1417 (2d ed. 1961); !I id. at 1515-18; Reese, Securities
Legislation of 1960, 17 Bus. I.Aw. 412 (1962).
3 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
4 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., !100 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1961).
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he would regard as material in determining his course of action. 5 The early
development of this form of the law of deceit occurred in the context of
the traditional fiduciary or confidential relationships involving, for example, agents and trustees. 6 The extent to which Congress, in enacting
clauses (I) and (2), intended to apply them to the comparatively modem
investment adviser-client relationship, and to liberalize the common-law
requirements of the tort in recognition of the special needs of the securities
business, presented the pivotal issue in the principal case.
In response to this issue, the district court ruled that the concepts of
fraud and deceit in clauses (1) ·and (2) were employed by Congress in the
strict common-law sense, that in order to sustain a violation it is necessary
to prove that defendants' conduct resulted in loss to clients or prospective
clients, and that no such showing had been made.7 This interpretation
seems unduly restrictive. In construing various antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws, in particular section 17(a) of the Securities Act of
1933,8 upon which clauses (I) and (2) were based,9 the courts have frequently declared that in order to sustain a violation every element of
common-law deceit need not be proved; 10 in particular, proof of loss has
been deemed unnecessary.11 This liberalization is the result of a recognition by Congress and the courts of the unique nature of the securities
business.12 "The essential objective of securities legislation is to protect
PROSSER, TORTS§ 87 (2d ed. 1955); REsTATEMENT, TORTS § 551 (1938).
2 REsTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 389 (1958); 1 REsTATEMENT (SECOND), TRusrs
§ 170 (1959).
7 Alternatively, the court said that proof that defendants intended their clients or
prospective clients to suffer a loss would satisfy clauses (1) and (2). Yet, not even at
common law was such an intent an element of the tort of deceit. 1 HARPER &: JAMES,
TORTS § 7.3 (1956); PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 5, § 88.
s 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1958).
9 Hearings on S. 1178 to S. 1182 Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate
Banking and Currency Committee, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 516-17 (1959); 3 Loss, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 1515. Clauses (1) and (3) of § 17 provide: "It shall be unlawful for
any person in the offer or sale of any securities ..• (1) to employ any device, scheme,
or artifice to defraud, or • • • (3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."
48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1958).
10 Norris &: Hirshberg, Inc. v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Hughes v. SEC,
174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Hughes &: Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944); Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 319
U.S. 767 (1943). Though such statements have usually been made in regard to deceit
by misrepresentation, they would seem to apply with equal force to deceit by nondisclosure.
11 "The fraud known to common law which required reliance on the alleged false
statements and resulting damage to the person addressed is not the fraud required to
constitute a violation of § 17(a)(l) of the Securities Act of 1933." Los Angeles Trust
Deed &: Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 264 F.2d 199, 210 (9th Cir. 1959). Similarly, in Hughes
v. SEC, supra note 10, at 974, a suit to revoke a broker-dealer's registration for fraudulent
activities, the court said that "the revocation is proper even if one, or none, of the
particular clients here involved has been misled or has suffered injury."
12 "The business of trading in securities is one in which opportunities for dishonesty are of constant recurrence and ever present. It engages acute, active minds,
trained to quick apprehension, decision and action. The Congress has seen fit to
5
6
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those who do not know market conditions from . . . those who do." 13
Apparently recognizing the unreasonableness of the requirement of
proof of loss under clauses (I) and (2), the majority in the principal case
rejected the district court's position. It affirmed, however, the finding that
deceit by nondisclosure had not been proved, on the ground that an investment adviser is under no affirmative duty to those advised to reveal information regarding his personal holdings in a recommended stock. This
determination was based primarily upon implications drawn from a recent
amendment of section 206 and the legislative history preceding that amendment. In 1960, Congress altered section 206 by adding clause (4), which
provides: "It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser ... (4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this
paragraph (4) by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts, practices, and courses of business as
are fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative." 14 In support of the enactment
of this provision, the SEC had expressed the doubt that clauses (I) and (2)
were limited by common-law concepts of fraud and deceit, and suggested
that clause (4) would enable the Commission "to deal adequately with such
problems as a material adverse interest in securities which the adviser is
recommending to his clients." 15 This purported inadequacy of clauses (I)
and (2) induced Congress to enact clause (4).16 Likewise, it influenced
the holding of the majority of the court in the principal case.
It is clear, nevertheless, that the relationship between the adviser and
his clients should be one of trust and confidence.17 Indeed, he has been
termed a fiduciary, 18 a characterization which has found some judicial
support. 10 Whether he advises individual clients in personal interviews or
a large number of persons through the mails, the investment adviser
expressly or impliedly represents that he is disinterested and that his paid
regulate this business. Though such regulation must be done in strict subordination
to constitutional and lawful safeguards of individual rights, it is to be enforced notwithstanding the frauds to be suppressed may take on more subtle and involved forms
than those in which dishonesty manifests itself in cruder and less specialized activities."
Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795, 803 (8th Cir. 1943).
Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943).
74 Stat. 887 (1960), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4) (Supp. III, 1961).
Hearings on S. 1178 to S. 1182, supra note 9, at 516-17. At the same time, the
SEC pointed out that "the language of section 206, making it unlawful to employ
any device to defraud a client, or to engage in any transaction which operates as a
deceit upon a client, are modeled on clauses (I) and (3) of section 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933. Under that section the common law deceit concepts no longer acted as a
bar to the defrauded buyer. • • . Therefore, a question arises as to the SEC's claim
that it has been limited by these concepts under section 206." Id. at 516-17.
16 See S. REP. No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1960).
17 That such a relationship should exist was expressly approved by the majority.
Principal case at 608.
18 SEC Securities Act Release No. 3043, Feb. 5, 1945.
10 Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
13
14
15
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advice is in the best interests of his clients. Yet he is not disinterested if he
himself is also a beneficial owner of a recommended stock. Viewed against
this back.ground, the weight given by the majority of the court to the
SEC's pronouncements before Congress, without an actual examination
of the relationship between the investment adviser and his customers or
the duties to which that relationship might give rise, is seemingly unjustified.
In SEC v. Torr,20 the presence of an undisclosed personal interest,
economically similar to that of the defendants in the principal case, was
held to constitute a violation of section 17(a)(l) of the Securities Act.
There, certain defendants recommended the purchase of a particular
stock without disclosing that they were to receive bonuses on those purchases resulting from their recommendations. Judge Patterson stated that
it was plain enough that this selling campaign "operated as a deceit on
purchasers.''21 The majority in the principal case approved the Torr decision, but apparently sought to distinguish it factually. In contrast to Torr,
the majority declared that "the SEC's proof tends only to show that, at
.most, defendant ... profited personally from the predictable market effect
of his honest advice." 22 Yet, in Torr, it could be said with equal accuracy
-that defendants merely profited from the predictable market effect of their
"honest" advice. As in the principal case, there was nothing to indicate that
any defendant misrepresented any fact bearing on the intrinsic worth of
the recommended stock. Nor can the cases be convincingly distinguished
on the basis of the relatively slight difference between the personal interests
of the respective defendants. Though Torr was, of course, a Securities Act
case, the origin of clauses (I) and (2) in section 17(a) and the policy of
Congress in favor of a broad construction of the securities laws suggest
that clauses (1) and (2) should be interpreted with the same justifiable
liberality which has been applied to the Securities Act generally, and,
specifically, that defendants' conduct in the principal case was, indeed,
within the scope of those provisions.2 3
The SEC's new rule-making power under clause (4) appears to have
influenced the majority's determination to a large extent. The majority
chose not to decide whether the first sentence, declaring fraudulent, de15 F. Supp. 315 (S,D.N.Y. 1936), rev'd on other grounds, 87 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1937).
Id. at 317. "When a person gives advice to buy a stock under circumstances that
lead the listener or reader to believe that the advice is disinterested, and suppresses the
fact that for giving such advice he is in reality being paid by one anxious to sell the
stock, the purchaser acting on the advice is imposed upon and deceived." Ibid.
22 Principal case at 609.
23 In an opinion of James A. Treanor, Jr., Director of the Trading and Exchange
Division, it was said: "An investment adviser is a fiduciary. As such he is required by
the common law to serve the interests of his client with undivided loyalty. In -my opinion
a breach of this duty may constitute a fraud within the meaning of clauses (1) and (2)
of section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act (as well as the antifraud provisions of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934)." SEC Securities Act
Release No. 3043, Feb. 5, 1945. A similar position has been taken by Professor Loss.
See 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1515.
20
21
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ceptive, or manipulative practices unlawful, was intended to be self-operative, that is, whether it could be invoked without the antecedent promulgation of regulations by the SEC. That such was the apparent intent of
Congress in the enactment of clause (4), however, would seem to follow
from the fact that its language was derived substantially from section
15(c)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a provision generally
agreed to be self-operative.24 In spite of the pronounced similarity between
these two sections in both language and purpose, the majority went on
to express a definite preference for antifraud enforcement under detailed
Commission rules, rather than through the judicial interpretation and application of broad statutory provisions.25 It would be unfortunate, however, if detailed regulations were to become the sole effective means of
enforcing section 206. The promulgation of such rules is an uncertain and
time-consuming process,26 and, if such rules must be applicable only to
specific types of fraudulent activities before the courts will view them favor~
ably, schemes may easily be devised to avoid their limited impact. The
congressional desire to strengthen the antifraud provisions of the Investment Advisers Act would be better served by a finding that the first sentence of clause (4) is self-operative, and by ascribing to it, and to rules
created under clause (4), the liberal construction common to other securities
laws.
Byron Bronston, S.Ed

24 48 Stat. 895, as amended, 49 Stat. 1378 (1936), added by 52 Stat. 1075 (1938), 15
U.S.C. § 780(c)(2) (1958); 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1425-26, 1517.
25 In its original opinion, the majority said: "[I]t seems appropriate that courts in
piecemeal fashion do not try to take over the regulatory function of the SEC and single
out a rather small advisory service and hold it in advance of trial responsible for violation of a rule which has not yet been promulgated and as to which there is no certainty
that it ever will be." SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 300 F.2d 745, 751
(2d Cir. 1961).
26 Judge Clark said in dissent: "Some of my brothers seemingly draw some comfort
in believing that the destructive effect of this construction of the statute will be limited
in effect and duration because of powers now granted to the SEC by the 1960 amend,ment to the statute.•.. The thought seems to be that the SEC will hereafter outlaw
the defendants' activities by regulation. This suggests an easy solution to a problem which
is obviously bemusing the court. But like many an 'easy' solution it becomes in reality
the harder one because of the difficulties it creates. Among those difficulties are those
of time, of power and validity of the indicated action, of legislative policy in the
premises, and of potential paralysis of agency action and the execution of Congressional
policies." Principal case at 618.

